Rising food prices could strain political stability in North Africa while creating new opportunities for jihadist groups in the Sahel.
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A new global food crisis is taking shape. This time, the conditions for a perfect storm are emerging from three sources: a sharp contraction in Ukraine’s grain exports amid continued Russian attacks on Black Sea port infrastructure, with the Ukrainian Agriculture Ministry now expecting agricultural exports in 2026-2027 to fall 54 percent below its earlier estimate and wheat exports by 53 percent; a forecast “Super El Niño” in the Pacific Ocean; and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which normally carries between 20 and 30 percent of internationally traded fertilizer.
The outlook reflects an underlying tension. The Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) 2026 State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World report points to a third consecutive year of improvement, with 2.1 billion people facing moderate or severe food insecurity in 2025, 86 million fewer than a year earlier. Yet U.S. Department of Agriculture projections for wheat production in major exporting countries in the 2026-2027 season are less reassuring. Forecasts for several major producers were revised downward in the first part of the year, only partly offset by more recent data from Russia and Ukraine.
Markets are already showing signs of strain. In September 2026, the FAO Food Price Index rose to 136 points, its highest level since November 2022, while the cereal sub-index stood 17.2 percent above its level a year earlier. FAO Chief Economist Maximo Torero has warned that disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and the Black Sea, compounded by climate shocks, could soon feed through to consumer prices, particularly in countries heavily dependent on food and energy imports. What does this mean for a region where food is not merely an economic issue, but a factor in both political stability and jihadist recruitment?
North Africa enters this crisis in a stronger position than usual. Rainfall has been exceptionally high in parts of the region this year, including Morocco, which recorded its heaviest precipitation in 25 years. This has helped lift the regional wheat harvest to 20 million metric tons for the 2025-2026 season, 15 percent more than the previous year, with Morocco nearly doubling its own production. As a result, wheat imports are forecast to fall by 13 percent in 2026-2027, with Morocco alone expected to cut imports by 43 percent.
It would be a mistake, however, to read these figures as evidence of a structural reversal. The region remains among the world’s most dependent on grain imports, averaging about 25 million metric tons per year between 2020 and 2025, including Egypt, despite substantial domestic production. If El Niño strengthens as forecast, the buffer created by stronger harvests in Morocco and Egypt could disappear quickly, while global prices come under additional pressure from disruptions to oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz. Relief on the fertilizer side is likely to remain limited. A UN-monitored mechanism proposed in early October would allow only three to seven fertilizer vessels a day to pass through the strait, compared with around 130 vessels of all types before the war.
In North Africa, bread subsidies are not merely a form of social policy, but a fundamental pillar of political stability. When flour prices rise, governments absorb much of the additional cost, placing further strain on already weak public finances and, in some cases, constraining the state’s room for maneuver.
Research by the New England Complex Systems Institute found that sharp increases in global food prices have often coincided with waves of unrest in North Africa and the Middle East. The study suggests a broader pattern: When staple food prices rise rapidly above a certain threshold, the risk of politically destabilizing protests also increases.
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In 2008, for example, crossing that threshold coincided with more than 60 episodes of unrest in 30 countries. In 2011, similarly high food prices formed part of the broader economic pressures that contributed to the Arab Spring. Food prices and shortages have played a role in many episodes of political upheaval, from the French Revolution to the Spring of Nations in 1848.
The risks become even more severe moving south from the Maghreb into the Sahel, where food security is closely intertwined with the security outlook. Much of the region depends heavily on grain imports from Russia and Ukraine. In 2022, the World Bank warned that war between the two countries could have devastating consequences for Sahel states, potentially pushing tens of millions of people toward acute food insecurity.
The latest Cadre Harmonise analysis estimated that as many as 54.8 million people across West Africa and the Sahel faced acute food insecurity during the June-August 2026 lean season, including 9.1 million in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger alone.
El Niño adds another layer of risk. The World Food Program and the FAO estimate that it could push nearly 6 million more people into hunger across West and Central Africa, with effects potentially lasting into 2027 as successive harvests are disrupted. AGRHYMET, the regional climate center, cautions, however, that a strong El Niño does not automatically mean below-normal rainfall across the entire region. The greatest risk of rainfall deficits is concentrated in the western Sahel, particularly Senegal, Mauritania and western Mali.
A November 2024 report found that jihadist groups have exploited severe social stress to deepen political instability. Drawing on five years of data, the study attributed 60 percent of violent incidents in the central Sahel to such groups, which have used resource scarcity to their advantage and targeted vital infrastructure, including water networks. Similar attacks have also occurred in Libya.
Researchers also found that incidents linked to climate-induced resource scarcity, including disputes over land, water and livestock, increased by more than 114 percent between 2019 and 2023. Other research has found that climate pressures can deepen existing grievances and competition over resources, especially where governance is weak. In a 2025 analysis of Mali, GNET likewise argued that worsening climate conditions were creating opportunities that jihadist groups could exploit for recruitment and revenue.
The evidence suggests that climate and food pressures can intensify political instability and create conditions that jihadist groups are able to exploit. In Cairo or Tunis, food insecurity may contribute to street protests and broader social unrest. In the Sahel, the same pressures can also weaken local resilience and make recruitment easier for armed groups. The coordinated offensives in Mali in April and May 2026 showed that these organizations are already capable of operating on a broader regional scale. Pressure has not eased since. On September 10, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) attacked the army camp at Dioura in central Mali, killing at least 50 Malian soldiers and five Russian Africa Corps personnel. In the following days, it also struck military-escorted fuel convoys travelling from Senegal toward Bamako, including one attack about 100 kilometers from the capital. The group’s strategy of economic strangulation remains in force, with supply lines carrying food and fuel increasingly targeted.
North African governments absorb the initial shock, helped by strong 2025-2026 harvests. Food inflation begins to rise again during 2026-2027 as the effects of the Super El Niño weigh on the next planting season. Governments respond by expanding bread subsidies and absorbing higher import costs, increasing pressure on public finances without causing major political instability.
In the Sahel, JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province continue to make incremental gains by exploiting local grievances and competition over scarce resources, with the western Sahel most exposed to El Niño-related rainfall deficits. This contributes to a gradual erosion of state control in some areas, following patterns already visible in Burkina Faso.
A sharper rise in food prices, including even a partial increase in the price of bread, triggers protests in one or more North African countries. The risk is particularly acute in countries already facing high youth unemployment, weak growth and strained public finances.
At the same time, worsening food and water shortages in the Sahel create more favorable conditions for jihadist recruitment and local expansion. JNIM could use this environment to support another large-scale coordinated offensive. The resulting instability would increase migration and security pressures along the southern Mediterranean.
If El Niño proves less severe than expected and tensions in the Strait of Hormuz ease enough to restore fertilizer flows, North African harvests in 2026-2027 remain relatively strong. This would reduce pressure on food prices and ease the fiscal burden on Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.
In the Sahel, improved access to agricultural assistance, including drought-resistant seeds and support for water management, helps reduce some of the pressures that armed groups exploit for recruitment and influence.
If both developments occur, the region could experience a period of relative stabilization, with positive effects on state finances, migration pressures and conflict risks.
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© 2026 Copyright by Geopolitical Intelligence Services AG
View this report on the web:
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/food-crisis-africa/
Federica Saini Fasanotti is a military historian and specialist in counterinsurgency. Her fieldwork and research have covered, among others, Afghanistan, Libya, Ethiopia and Somalia, and her latest book is “La Forma della Guerra” (“The Shape of the War”) (Historical Office of the General Staff, Italian Ministry of Defense, 2022).
© 2026 Copyright by Geopolitical Intelligence Services AG
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